





I should like to address the impact of economic development in
technically backward countries on economic welfare in the industrialized
nations, a topic of great concern to many policy makers. As countries
that have been underdeveloped improve their industrial capabilities, they
can become significant contributors to the total world economy. From
a purely national perspective, however, their industries also are new
competitors to existing national industries. What is the net effect of this
change on the already industrialized countries?
It seems natural to take the classical Ricardo model of international
trade and see if it has something to say about this question. William
Baumol and I have done this in two recent papers (Gomory and Baumol
1995a, 1995b), summarized briefly here. We find that the model points
clearly to the possibility of conflict in the interests of the trading partners.
Outcomes that are very good for one country may not be good for its
trading partner, and the strengthening of one country often will come at
the expense of the welfare of the other.
MODEL AND METHOD
We work with the classical linear Ricardian model of international
trade. We assume single-input linear production functions eqlij for good
i in Country j and Cobb-Douglas utility Uj for Country j. We will fix the
sizes Lj of each country’s labor force and the demand parameters dij of the
two countries as well as n, the number of industries. A model is then
specified by the vector of average labor productivities e = {eq }. However,
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instead of dealing with one model, we will discuss the equilibrium outcomes
of a family of models. Specifically we will consider all possible productivity
values e restricted only by a maximum productivity conditionI in each
industry in each country eij <<- ei"jax. Different productivities e lead to
different equilibria and therefore to different utility outcomes. This
approach will enable us to analyze the effect of different productivities ~
on the welfare of the two countries.
For any particular choice of e with ely ~ e~jax, there is at equilibrium
a resulting national income Yj and a utility Uj for each country. From the
Yj we compute the relative national income Zj = Yj/(Y1 + Y2), which
we also refer to as share. We can then plot the equilibrium associated with
that choice of e as a point in a share versus utility (Z1, U1) diagram for
Country 1. This is done in Figure 1, which shows a few randomly chosen
equilibria. We can do the same for Country 2. Figure 2 shows the same
equilibria as points in a (Z1, U2) diagram. Note that in both diagrams
Z1, which is Country l’s share, is measured from the left vertical axis and
Z2, which is Country 2’s share and is therefore 1 - Z~, is the distance
from the right vertical axis.
Alternatively, we could plot each point in a (Z~, Y1) diagram instead
of a (Z1, U1) diagram. This would be a plot of share versus national income.
The graphs in both cases look much the same and have the same economic
consequences. Our theory has been developed with utility rather than
national income, and most of the calculations have in fact used utility as the
vertical axis rather than national income. However, the use of national
income sometimes makes the results more intuitive, as we will see below.
In either plot, each possible e gives us a single equilibrium point in
the Country I diagram and another point in the Country 2 diagram. The
ensemble of all such equilibrium points gives us a region of equilibria
in each diagram. Figure 3 shows the region of equilibria for Country 1.
The dark line is the approximate upper boundary2 of the region and
every point below it is an equilibrium for some choice of e. This region of
equilibria has a definite shape whose main characteristics are the same for
all choices of maximal productivities ei’j~x. This shape can be shown to
emerge from the model by a careful mathematical analysis as is done in
Gom.ory and Baumol (1995b), but it also has a very intuitive basis, which
we will describe below. Figure 4 shows the region for Country 2.
Since Z2 = 1 - Z~, we can combine the two diagrams as in Figure
5. U1 is read from the right vertical axis and U2 from the left vertical axis.
The two points representing the same equih’brittm are now vertically above
1 It is easy to amend this restriction to allow for the increase of the maximum
productivity over time.
2 The boundary has some fine structure. It is not a smooth curve but instead rather
jagged. As n, the number of industries, increases, however, the jaggedness decreases in scale













Figures 1 to 4
Equilibria Associated with Randomly Chosen Productivity
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each other but they have different heights, representing the different utility
outcomes for the two countries. The highest point in Country l’s equilibrium
region always lies to the right of that for Country 2. We can see from Figure
5 that the best outcome for Country I is always a poor outcome for Country
2 and vice versa. Thus, the regional shape suggests the following:3
3 These results tend to resemble those of the new trade theory, based on economies of
scale, to which recent writings have contributed so much (Helpman and Krugman 1985;
Krugman 1979 and 1990). There is in fact a close inherent connection between the regions282 Ralph E. Gomory
There is inherent conflictin the interests of two trading partners in
the sense that the best outcomes for one country usually are poor
outcomes for the other.
While in parts of the region improvements in productivity in
Country 2 (which easily are shown to increase its share) will
produce improvement in welfare in both Country 2 and Country
1, in other parts of the region improvements in productivity (and
hence share) in Country 2 will strictly decrease the utility of
Country 1.4
~NTUITIVE EXPLANATION OF THE REGIONAL SHAPE
The shape of the region can be derived in a purely mathematical
way. The boundaries in many industry problems can even be very closely
approximated by a very simple linear programming calculation. How-
ever, there is also a direct intuitive explanation.
For this intuitive explanation we will use the plot of national income
versus share. Let us imagine two countries that are roughly equivalent.5
Their maximal productivities eij are near to each other, their labor
forces are roughly the same size, and their demand structures are similar.
Let us ask what a plot of world output, the sum of both countries" output,
looks like under these circumstances. Intuitively, we would expect it to
peak in the middle of the diagram as it does in Figure 6. Certainly, toward
the right-hand end of the diagram Country 1 has a share of almost 100
percent, so it does almost all the producing. At these equilibrium points
the productivities of Country 2 are very small in almost all industries.
At these points total world output is only slightly in excess of what
Country 1 can produce in autarky. As we move toward the middle and
Country 2’s share increases, world output increases because at these
equilibria the productivity in Country 2 is much greater; it is the producer
in more and more industries. This argument can be replicated starting
from the extreme left of the diagram where Country 2 is the producer in
almost every industry. So by intuitive means we come to the conclusion
that the peak in total world output should be roughly in the middle.
If we now consider that Country 1, at each equilibrium, gets its share
of equilibria that are obtained in the linear models and the regions of equilibria introduced
in Gomory (1994) for economies of scale models. The shape of these regions has been
elucidated in Gomory and Baumol (1994). This connection between the linear family and the
economies of scale models is explained in Gomory and Baumol (1995b).
4 The important possibility that an increase in the productivity in one country can be
harmful to another in linear Ricardo models first was pointed out in Hymans and Stafford
(1995) and Johnson and Stafford (1993).
s These assumptions are made only to simplify the intuitive explanation. Equivalent
reasoning can be carried through for countries that are completely different, but the
explanation becomes more elaborate and less intuitive.INHERENT CONFLICT IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 283
Figures 5 to 8
Combined World Output
Combined Equilibria (Countries 1 and 2) and Upper Boundary
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of total world output, then the Country 1 income at the 50 percent share
point is one-half the total world income, at the 75 percent share mark is
three-fourths of the world income, and so on. If we plot in all these points,
we will get the upper boundary for Country I as it is shown in Figure 6.
Thus, the upper boundary curve for Country I is easily derived from the
world curve.284 Ralph E. Gomory
Figures 9 and 10
Upper Boundary and Subregion
of Maximal Productivity
for Country 2
Upper Boundaries and Subregions
of Maximal Productivity
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Exactly the same reasoning applies to Country 2. If we derive
Country 2’s upper boundary from the world curve, we obtain Figure 7,
which shows the regions for both countries. Thus we arrive in an intuitive
way at the shapes of both countries’ regions and at the relation of the two
regions to each other. We can see that Country l’s peak is to the right
because although world output is decreasing, Country l’s share of it is
increasing. Similarly, Country 2’s peak is to the left, because as we move
to the left from the middle, world output decreases but Country 2’s share
increases. It is the role of share that introduces the element of conflict
between the two trading partners.
THE REGION OF MAXIMAL PRODUCTIVITY
If at an equilibrium the producing country in each industry is using
its maximal productivity, we will call this a maximal productivity
equilibrium. All maximal productivity equilibria lie in the subregion of
maximal productivity, whose shape is illustrated for Country I in Figure
8, for Country 2 in Figure 9, and for the two together in Figure 10. The
approximate boundary of this subregion also can be calculated by linear
programming methods. When the producing countries are practicing
something near the best possible technology (for that time), the resulting
equilibria always will lie in the region of maximal productivity.INHERENT CONFLICT IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 285
THE IDEAL TRADING PARTNER
If Country 1 has productivities a~, which of Country 2’s many
possible parameter values make Country 2 the ideal trading partner for
Country 1 in the sense of maximizing its utility? Based on the regional
shape, a rough answer can be summarized as follows: For countries of
roughly the same size, the ideal trading partner for Country 1 is one
whose productivities allow Country I to make most of the world’s goods
while Country 2 produces at maximal productivity in the smaller set of
goods it does make. A high-technology country making most things for
itself but trading for a few goods with an agricultural country is an
illustrative example. This outcome, while the most desirable one for
Country 1, is not a good outcome for Country 2. Note that if Country 2 is
the ideal trading partner for Country 1, then any change in Country 2"s
production parameters, whether an increase or a decrease, will be
detrimental to Country 1.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We have described the existence of a well-defined region of possible
equilibria that has a robust characteristic shape. One consequence of the
shape is that the best equilibria for one country are generally poor ones
for its trading partner, so that a successful national policy aimed at
attaining or retaining such a position involves inherent conflict in the
interests of the two countries.
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